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Abstract
We explore the consequences of the utility requirement for patents on
speed of innovation. Basic research output, that has no immediate appli-
cation except for as a step to further research, may not be patentable be-
cause it does not fulﬁll the utility requirement of patentability. Patentabil-
ity of basic research diﬀers from the questions analyzed in the past sequen-
tial innovation framework, in that basic research has no market value in
itself and patentability of the ﬁrst-stage invention, rather than that of the
second-stage invention, is an issue. There is never immediate gain for the
innovator (or static loss to society) of obtaining a patent and the gain
is purely from appropriating future success of the application technology.
We extend Denicolo (2000) model to identify conditions in which allowing
basic research to be patented is socially desirable.
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11 Introduction
Utility, together with novelty and inventive step (or non-obviousness), consti-
tutes one of the three basic requirements for patentability. When research is
directly guided by “real-world” necessities, it is easy to establish the utility of
inventions. However, when it is driven by the discovery of new scientiﬁc tools,
as in the biotechnology industry, it may bring about an intermediate technology,
the real world utility of which can be discovered only after further research. The
utility requirement may reject patentability of such an intermediate technology.
Despite of increasing importance of utility standard in science-driven innova-
tion, there are no substantive economic analyses of the standard.1 The purpose
of this paper is to present a framework and analyze the welfare implications
of the utility standard. The economic rationale of utility standard can be best
clariﬁed in the context of cumulative innovation, since such standard rejects
patentability on the reason that research is still incomplete. The past stud-
ies on the role of patent in cumulative innovation have focused mainly on the
patentability of follow-up inventions and the infringement possibility of such
inventions on the prior inventions (Scotchmer and Green (1995) and Denicolo
(2000)). This study focuses on the economic eﬀects of the patentability of ﬁrst
stage inventions, while assuming patentability of the second stage inventions.
We ﬁrst identify how utility requirement diﬀers from the novelty require-
ment, using the framework of Scotchmer and Green (1990). Then, we extend
Denicolo (2000)’s model of the two stage patent race with free entry, incorpo-
rating trade secret protection and ﬁxed cost of research so as to analyze the
economic eﬀects of utility standard in sequential innovation. We consider two
patent regimes, the monopoly case where the patent holder of the intermediate
technology can block the entry in the D stage research, and the ex-post license
case, where such ﬁrm cannot block the entry but can collect half of the com-
mercialization revenue in case a competitor is successful in the D stage research.
This is because enforcing the patent of an intermediate technology against the
follow-up research might be diﬃcult, since research process itself can be kept
secret. In such a case, the patent holder may be able to enforce its right only ex-
post when the successful ﬁrm in the development stage wishes to commercialize
its patent.
Because of free entry in both basic research and development stages (R stage
1There have been some legal analysis of this issue, notably Grady and Alexander (1992),
Merges (1997), and Heller and Eisenberg (1998).
1and D stage respectively), the rent obtained from the commercialization of the
completed technology is dissipated, irrespective of the patentability of an inter-
mediate research. In the patentability case, it will be dissipated more in the
R stage (larger R expenditures and more entries in R stage competition). We
show that preventing dissipation of the rent in the D stage through a patent
can be critical to guarantee investment in basic research, particularly if spillover
is very likely, or research in either stage is very expensive. We also show that
patentability becomes less attractive as the variable or the ﬁxed cost of the R
stage research declines. We also extend the analysis to the case where the patent
of the intermediate technology resulting from basic research cannot prevent en-
try of competing ﬁrms in development stage research either due to a compulsory
license or due to a constraint in enforcing the patent right to the development
stage research even if it is enforceable at the commercialization stage.
In the remainder of this section, we present a brief background and issues
regarding the utility requirement. Section 2 reviews three papers we feel our
work is most closely related, and clariﬁes the diﬀerence between utility and
novelty standard. Section 3 presents the analysis of utility standard based on
two-stage patent race. Sections on welfare implications and compulsory licensing
follow.
1.1 Utility and description requirements
Utility, together with novelty and inventive step (or non-obviousness), consti-
tutes one of the three basic requirements for patentability. It requires that
invention can bring about a speciﬁc technical eﬀect. In Japan, the patent law
requires industrial applicability of an invention (Article 29). In addition it qual-
iﬁes invention as technical idea (Article 2)2. This requires that “invention has
to be suﬃciently speciﬁc and objective so as to allow the persons with ordinal
knowledge in the related technical area to reproduce the intended technical ef-
fects. If the technologies are not developed enough to this degree, invention is
incomplete, not satisfying the requirement of Article 2”3. Thus, patentability
of invention can be denied if it is technically incomplete. The description and
the enablement requirement on patent speciﬁcation in Article 36.4 stipulates a
2It says that ”Invention” in this Law means the highly advanced creation of technical ideas
by which a law of nature is utilized.
3See the Japanese Supreme Court decision (October 13 in 1977). The Japanese Supreme
Court denied a patent application for nuclear reactor in 1969, pointing out that the invention is
incomplete, since it does not clarify speciﬁc measures to ensure safety of the reactor operation
among others.
2similar requirement4.
In the U.S.A utility requirement is deﬁned in Section 101, which states that
“Whoever invents any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, improve-
ment thereof, or composition of mater may obtain a patent therefore”5 The
recent guidelines of the USPTO interprets that Section 101 requires that “an
invention must be supported by a speciﬁc, substantial and credible utility.” Ac-
cording to the guideline, utility speciﬁc to the subject matter, instead of general
utility, has to be claimed. Utilities that require or constitute carrying out fur-
ther research to identify or reasonably conﬁrm a “real world” context of use are
not substantial utilities. In addition, an assertion is credible unless the logic un-
derlying the assertion is seriously ﬂawed, or the facts upon which the assertion
is based are inconsistent with the logic underlying the assertion. The utility
requirement is also implicit in Section 112, which requires written descriptions
of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it without
undue experimentation.”
1.2 When does utility requirement becomes an issue ?
Utility requirement can become an important issue in cumulative research area,
which is driven by scientiﬁc discoveries. When research is directly guided by
“real-world” necessities, it would be easy to establish the utility of inventions.
However, when R&D is driven by the discovery of new scientiﬁc tools, as in
biotechnology industry, it may bring about research outcomes, the real world
utility of which can be discovered only after further research. Utility require-
ment and description requirement may reject patentability of such intermediate
research results.
Traditionally, utility requirement has been an issue in chemical industry. In
this industry, research may yield synthesized compounds for which no particular
use is known. The following U.S. Supreme Court ruling (the Brenner ruling)
supports the denial of the patent for such compounds if it fails to disclose any
utility, even though it is closely related to another compound which is useful6.
4It says that “the detailed explanation of the invention under the preceding Subsection (iii)
shall state the invention, as provided for in an ordinance of the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry, in a manner suﬃciently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out
by a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains.”
5The law of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not regarded to be
patentable subject matter.
6There is a ruling by a lower court, consistent with the Brenner ruling, saying that chemical
compound is not presumed useful merely because it is similar to other useful compounds (in
re Kirk, 376 F. 2d 936, 942, 153 U.S.P.Q. 48, 54 (C. C. P. A. 1967)).
3“Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a particular product
shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of
precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable
area. Such a patent may confer power to block oﬀ whole areas of scientiﬁc
development, without compensating beneﬁt to the public. The basic quid pro
quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the beneﬁt derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search,
but compensation for its successful conclusion.” (Brenner v. Manson, 383 U. S.
519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966))
This ruling, however, is considered to represent the “high-water mark” of
utility doctrine (Merges (1997)). The recent ruling in re Brana in 1995, which
has established that utility for pharmaceutical products can be established by
animal testing, seems to depend on an underlying logic conﬂicting with the
above supreme court ruling at least on its face: “FDA approval, however, is not
a prerequisite for ﬁnding a compound useful within the meaning of patent laws.
Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical
inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of further research and develop-
ment. The stage at which an invention in this ﬁeld becomes useful is well before
it is ready to be administered to humans. Were we to require Phase II testing in
order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from
obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating
an incentive to pursue, through research and development, potential cures in
many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.”(In re Brana 51 F. 3d 1560,
34 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995))
More recently, utility and enablement requirement has become a big issue
in biotechnology area. Its innovation has been driven by scientiﬁc progress, so
that research based on recent scientiﬁc advances has resulted in intermediate
results such as identiﬁcation of gene sequences, which are mainly useful since
they enable further research. One of the most famous early cases is the patent
application of partial genetic sequences (expressed sequences tags or EST) by
NIH (Dr. Craig Venter) in 1991. NIH claimed that these can be used as diag-
nostic probes, identiﬁcation of chromosomes, etc, which are uncertain generic
utilities. NIH, however, gave up patenting in 1994, when they faced a rejection
by USPTO, based on utility and other requirements, as well as strong criticism
from scientiﬁc and the other circles.
Utility requirement is an important issue in biotechnology industry in the
4following contexts.
(1) With regard to genetic sequences such as ESTs and cDNA, there remains a
question of how speciﬁc utility a ﬁrm has to establish in order to be qualiﬁed as
patents.
(2) Similar points apply to the proteins obtained from genetic sequences. Is the
utility estimated based upon computer-based homology credible and substantial
enough? Or are the experimental tests necessary?
(3) Can a ﬁrm, which has discovered a research tool such as a target protein for
screening, also get a patent for the research results such as activating compounds
(agonists) or medicaments using the agonistics, which may be obtained from
using such research tool? This is the issue of reach-through claim.
The patentability of research results is especially important for ﬁrms spe-
cialized in research, which are very important part of the U.S. biotechnology in-
dustry. Since these ﬁrms do not have internal assets to implement downstream
research such as clinical testing, patents for intermediate research results are
important for them to sell the research outputs or to attract investment money
for engaging in downstream research. The head of the leading U.S. biotechnol-
ogy venture ﬁrm states the following: “Some argue that the invention is not
complete until the precise biological activity of an individual gene is identiﬁed;
indeed, there is some indication that the Patent Oﬃce intends to apply the new
guidelines in this way. This argument ignores the real world utility, described
above, associated with the isolation, sequencing and identiﬁcation of genes and
their classiﬁcation into categories whose general functions are known. If this
standard were to apply, then only those companies that adhered to the ineﬃ-
cient, vertically-integrated pharmaceutical industry model would be entitled to
patents. This approach would be at odds with the evolution of the pharma-
ceutical industry, with its attendant eﬃciencies.”(Testimony of Randal Scott,
president and chief scientiﬁc oﬃcer of Incyte Genomics Inc., before the U.S.
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, July 13,
2000)
Another context where utility can become an issue is concept patent. It
is patenting of a general product or business idea, using new technology. The
idea is easy to come up, so that it has little role in advancing knowledge, but
which has to be used widely in applying new technology. Such concept patent
would discourage R&D for discovering application technologies for using new
technology, since it enables the patentee to collect royalty, but does not aid
R&D at all in terms of knowledge. Such invention may be rejected based on a
5non-obviousness requirement, but can also be rejected based on the absence of
speciﬁc utility.
The above discussions suggest the following analytical questions.
(1) What is the economic eﬀect of patentability of intermediate research result?
(2) Under what conditions patentability of intermediate research will improve
welfare?
Analysis of these issues would help clarifying why the utility requirement
is necessary ﬁrst of all. People may wonder whether we should eliminate the
utility requirement and leave the utility test to the market competition, since
business knows utility better than the patent oﬃce. It would also indicate how
it should be exercised.
1.3 Economic eﬀects of utility standard
There are two important eﬀects of patentability of an intermediate technol-
ogy. First, patentability of intermediate technology would enhance incentive
for engaging in the ﬁrst stage research competition for discovering intermediate
technology, while it can constrain research competition in the D stage. There
are two reasons why patentability promotes the R stage of research. Firms can
choose to patent the intermediate technology only if patent protection yields
higher proﬁt than trade secret. In addition, patentability of an intermediate
technology will facilitate the entry by a ﬁrm specialized in research (e.g. biotech-
nology ventures). Our analysis does not explicitly analyze the second aspect.
Patentability of intermediate technology constrains research competition in the
second stage, since such research infringes the patent of the intermediate tech-
nology, although ex-ante licensing if feasible can reduce such negative eﬀect.
Whether patentability promotes the overall research or not depends on which
eﬀects are more important.
Secondly, patentability of intermediate technology would enhance incentive
for disclosure. Unless intermediate technology is patentable, a ﬁrm would not
voluntarily disclose it, since an intermediate technology has no direct commercial
value and it is a source of the competitive advantage in the D stage research
competition. However, there are subtle points both in the eﬀect of patentability
on disclosure and in the economic eﬀect of disclosure. It is important to note
that the intermediate technologies protected by trade secret can spillover to
competitors. It may take place through academic publications and contacts
among researchers of competing ﬁrms, which are important in science-driven
6innovation. Patentability may not signiﬁcantly enhance disclosure, if a ﬁrm
seeks a patent when such spillover risk of trade secret is high.
The disclosure of patented intermediate technology forces competing ﬁrms
to avoid investment for reinventing the wheel. It is important to note that a ﬁrm
choosing trade secret may also be able to force such shakeout by announcing dis-
covery without disclosing technical details, as assumed by Green and Scotchmer
(1990). Disclosure of intermediate technology may also generate inter-temporal
spillover by enabling the entry of competing ﬁrms in the D stage research, using
the disclosed patented technology. In the case of utility standard, however, the
D stage research would infringe the patent of intermediate technology, since the
D stage research would use the patented technologies such as new chemicals
or gene fragments. Thus, the patent holder of the intermediate technology can
potentially block the entry. However, enforcing the patent of an intermediate
technology against the follow-up research might be diﬃcult, since research pro-
cess itself can be kept secret. In this case a ﬁrm which protects the intermediate
technology by patent also faces competition in the D stage due to spillover. We
will incorporate these subtle points in our analysis.
2 Existing literature
In this section we review three paper that we believe our work is most closely re-
lated. Grossman and Shapiro (1987) analyzes whether ﬁrms support patentabil-
ity of intermediate technology in the framework of a two-stage race among
duopolists, in which the completion of the ﬁrst stage research is necessary for
commencing the second stage research but the ﬁrst stage research has no com-
mercial value. Based on simulations, they suggest that intermediate patent may
be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms ex post (i. e. after the ﬁrst stage research), but not ex
ante, since it intensiﬁes competition. They assume that an intermediate patent
requires the competing ﬁrm to drop out of the second stage research race, so
that the second stage research is monopolized. They ignore the possibility of
trade secret protection. They do not analyze welfare.
Scotchmer and Green (1990) analyzes novelty standard with respect to the
interim innovation in duopoly competition. The major focus of their analysis
is the role of the patent in facilitating disclosure, which accelerates research in
their model. They take into account the possibility that a ﬁrm chooses trade
secret for intermediate technology even if it is patentable. They ﬁnd that a
7weak novelty requirement promotes disclosure while it does not undermine ex
ante proﬁt signiﬁcantly, and that the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle regime encourages disclosure
more than the ﬁrst-to-invent regime (see the Appendix how these ﬁnding can be
carried over to the case of utility standard). It is important to note that utility
standard is diﬀerent from novelty standard in the following two aspects. First,
in the novelty case the intermediate technology can have a direct commercial
value and can compete with the ﬁnal innovation, as assumed by Green and
Scotchmer (1990), while it does not in the utility case. Second, in the case of
the novelty standard, the second innovation may not infringe the ﬁrst patented
intermediate innovation, as assumed by Green and Scotchmer, even if patented.
In the utility standard case, the secondary innovation infringes the patented
ﬁrst innovation, since the ﬁrst innovation provides input to the research in the
second stage research. Furthermore, they analyze the issue in a relatively rigid
model where the levels of R&D investments are ﬁxed and market structure is
duopolies.
Denicolo (2000) analyzes the optimal degree of forward patent protection of
the ﬁrst innovation in the framework of a two-stage patent race. In his model,
the patentability of the ﬁrst stage innovation is assumed and he analyzes the
economic eﬀects of the patentability of the secondary innovation and its poten-
tial infringement of the ﬁrst innovation, or the degree of forward protection. He
shows that strong forward protection becomes less attractive as the relative prof-
itability of the ﬁrst innovation increases and the relative diﬃculty of obtaining it
decreases. Although we use and extend his analytical framework, we address a
diﬀerent issue. We analyze the economic consequences of the patentability of the
ﬁrst innovation by comparing the case where the ﬁrst innovation is patentable
under the weak standard of utility and the case where it is not patentable due
to the strong standard of utility so that it can only be protected by trade secret.
Although the ﬁrst case is equivalent either to UI (the secondary innovation is
unpatentable and infringing) or PI (the secondary innovation is patentable and
infringing) in the Denicolo analysis, he has not analyzed the case where ﬁrst
innovation is protected only by trade secret. In addition, we incorporate ﬁxed
cost of research in the analysis, since duplicative aspects or economy of scale
may be important especially in development stage of research.
83 A Model
In this section we extend the two stage patent race model of Denicolo (2000) in
order to analyze the economic eﬀects of the utility standard. We assume free
entry in research competition, unless it is constrained by patent, as in Denicolo
(2000). We also assume that a ﬁrm can protect intermediate technology by trade
secret, even if the ﬁrm does not choose to protect the intermediate technology
by a patent. This assumption is realistic in the analysis of utility standard,
since a ﬁrm does not directly commercialize the intermediate technology for the
general public consumption. The intermediate technology such as a research
tool is used only for further research.
A ﬁrm which protects the intermediate technology by trade secret faces po-
tential competition of being leap-frogged in the R stage competition. That is,
the other ﬁrms may (will eventually in the case of Poisson discovery process)
discover the same intermediate technology and enter into the D stage research
competition. Since we assume that research expenditure in each stage is com-
pletely sunk once commenced, there is no reason for a ﬁrm to drop out of com-
petition unless it believes that it cannot proﬁtably enter in the D stage research
competition. We assume that the ﬁrm which protects intermediate technology
chooses to force competitors out of research competition by committing a large
scale development research, taking advantage of its ﬁrst-mover position. This
is a proﬁt-maximizing conduct when the ﬁxed cost of development research is
large. We assume that the intermediate technologies protected by trade se-
cret can spillover to competitors, with a certain probability. For simplicity, we
assume that the ﬁrm which has discovered an intermediate technology immedi-
ately knows that whether it spillovers completely or whether it can be protected
completely.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i chooses research intensity xit for cost of ct for R&D at
stage t, where t = R or t = D. Firm i will be the ﬁrst to succeed at time τ where
τ is distributed according to a Poisson process. We assume there is a ﬁxed cost
ft to participate in stage t. If the intermediate technology is patentable, then
the patentee can either be the sole developer of ﬁnal technology or license the
intermediate technology to other ﬁrms for development. This is equivalent to
Denicolo’s UI or PI with v1 = 0. (Because it is basic research, there is no value
to the intermediate technology itself.)
If the intermediate technology is not patentable, then only the ﬁrm that
achieved the intermediate technology is immediately able to proceed to the
9D stage unless there is spillover. Spillover of the intermediate technology will
occur with probability γ. When spillover occurs, the original innovator is unable
to prevent others from using the intermediate technology to develop the ﬁnal
technology since there is no patent protection. If there is no spillover, the
patentee has some advantage but not complete control - patentee must take
into account that other ﬁrms may also move onto D stage by their own success.
Thus we assume the patentee invests to deter or blockade entry when there is
no spillover.
3.1 D Stage investment
We will ﬁrst analyze the D stage investment behavior under the two patent
regimes.
The intermediate technology is Patentable
Even when the intermediate technology is patentable, a ﬁrm may prefer to resort
to trade secrets if it chooses. This would result in Not Patentable regime of the
next section. In this section we will characterize the equilibrium investment
when the ﬁrm patents. It will be shown later that a ﬁrm always prefers to
patent if this is legally possible.
When ﬁrm has the patented technology, it is able to invest as a monopolist.
It chooses x to maximize,
Z ∞
0
exp−(x+r)τxvdτ − cDx − fD =
xv
x + r
− cDx − fD.














The equilibrium D stage proﬁt when the intermediate technology is patented is,
πP
D = πm and the corresponding investment is XP
D = xm.
10The intermediate technology is Not Patentable
When the intermediate technology is not patentable, there are two subgames
after completion of the R stage: one where spillover occurs (with probability γ)
and one without. If there is spillover, the ﬁrm must compete with new entrants
into the D stage. If there is no spillover, the ﬁrm must invest to deter entry in
case another ﬁrm obtains the intermediate technology on its own.
We start with the case of no spillover. The ﬁrm chooses x to deter entry.




exp−(xe+x+r)τxvdτ − cDx − fD =
xev
xe + x + r
− cDxe − fD, (1)
v is the value of the ﬁnal technology. The entrant will invest to maximize this





xe + x + r
− cD = 0.
The incumbent will produce x so proﬁt (1) will be zero even when the entrant
















This condition also guarantees πm ≥ 0. The equilibrium proﬁt with entry
deterrence will be,






























Proﬁt is increasing in fD. Larger fD reduces the entry deterrent investment
level making it closer to the monopoly level.
If there is spillover, there are n ﬁrms (the number determined in equilibrium)







j=1 xj+r)τxivdτ −cDxi −fD =
xiv
Pn
j=1 xj + r
−cDxi −fD. (2)





j6=i xj + r
xi +
P
j6=i xj + r
− cD = 0. (3)
There will be an incentive to invest a positive amount when this marginal proﬁt
is positive at xi = 0 which will hold if v > cDr.
In symmetric equilibrium with free entry, proﬁt given by (2) should equal 0
and xj = x for all j. Equations (2) and (3) become
xv
nx + r
− cDx − fD = 0,
(n − 1)x + r
(nx + r)2 v − cD = 0.
The two equations characterize the equilibrium investment and number of ﬁrms.8






Ignoring the integer problem, we have the equilibrium number of ﬁrms engaged










Number of ﬁrms is decreasing in both costs. The total investment is,






Note that xb → X0 as fD → 0. Entry deterrence is impossible if there is no
7All summation hereafter will be for i = 1,...,n unless noted j 6= i which is for j =
1,...,i − 1,i + 1,...n.
8We ﬁrst derive the relationship,




12ﬁxed cost. The equilibrium proﬁt when there is spillover is 0. Straightforward
calculation yields,
Lemma 1.
xm < xb < X0, πm > πb.
The equilibrium D stage proﬁt when the intermediate technology is not
patentable is,
πN
D = γ0 + (1 − γ)πb. (4)
This is less than πm.
Lemma 2. The ﬁrm will always patent the intermediate technology if it is
patentable. That is, πP
D > πN
D.
3.2 R stage investment
General solution of R stage
We derive a general solution for R stage when the payoﬀ to the winner from the
D stage is πD and loser gets nothing. Firm i’s expected payoﬀ when it invests





j6=i xj + r
− cRxi − fR. (5)





j6=i xj + r
xi +
P
j6=i xj + r
πD − cR = 0. (6)
There will be an incentive to invest a positive amount when this marginal proﬁt
is positive at xi = 0 which will hold if πD > cDr.
In symmetric equilibrium with free entry (5) should equal 0 and xj = x for
all j. Equations (5) and (6) become
xπD
nx + r
− cRx − fR = 0,
(n − 1)x + r
(nx + r)2 πD − cR = 0.
The two equations characterize the equilibrium investment and number of ﬁrms.






In order for this to be positive (interior solution), proﬁt from the next stage must
be suﬃciently large, πD > fR. Investment is decreasing in both marginal and
ﬁxed costs and increasing in D stage proﬁt πD. Ignoring the integer problem,



















The aggregate investment, XR, is always increasing in D stage proﬁt:










if πD > fR and XR = 0 otherwise. This together with Lemma 1 highlights how
investment is increased in one stage at the cost of reducing it in the other.
Proposition 1. Patentability of the intermediate technology increases R stage
research investment but reduces D stage investment.
The equilibrium investments when the intermediate technology is patentable,
XP
R, and when not patentable, XN
R can be found by substituting the appropriate
equilibrium proﬁts from D stage, πP
D and πN
D. We make the following observa-
tion:
Proposition 2. When the intermediate technology is not patentable, spillover
must be unlikely and costs (fR and cR) small for there to be investment in the
intermediate technology. That is,
XP
R > 0 ⇔
p










We can also identify the minimum level of D stage proﬁt to guarantee R
stage activity,
14Corollary 1. In order for there to be positive R stage investment, D stage proﬁt













The value v is the private value for the ﬁrm. To the society as whole, there is





is the ”adjusted probability” of innovating (Denicolo (2000)). It discounts the
value according to the delay which is distributed according to a Poisson process.
The expected welfare is,
W(XR,XD) = P(XR){P(XD)(v + s) − cDXD − fD} − cRXR − fR.




















In equilibrium, proﬁt is bit down to zero at the beginning of the game, both
for ﬁrms in R stage competition and for ﬁrms that enter at D stage. Welfare





R ){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb)}s.
Using (4) and Lemma 1, the adjusted probabilities for each stage is , for any γ,
P(XR(πN
D) = P(XR((1 − γ)πb)) < P(XR(πP
D)) = P(XR(πm)),
γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb) > P(XP
D) = P(xm).
15From Lemma 1, P(XN
R ) is decreasing in γ while γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb) is
increasing in γ. Greater spillover beneﬁts society at the D stage but it has an
adverse eﬀect on R stage investment. We are able to identify situations where
patentability of the intermediate technology is beneﬁcial and not beneﬁcial to
society.
Proposition 3. When the ﬁrst or second stage of research is expensive (high
ﬁxed costs fD, fR or marginal costs cD, cR), relative to the value of the ﬁnal
patent, v, patentability of the intermediate technology tends to increase welfare.
Proof. Under such circumstances patentability can increase the chance that a
ﬁrm engages in research ﬁrst of all. It can enhance the probability of the success
of the R stage research signiﬁcantly. Given that a ﬁrm can recover investment in
R stage research only from the commercialization value of the D stage research,
not only high cost of R stage research but also high cost of D stage research
tends to favor patentability of the intermediate technology.
Proposition 4. Patentability of intermediate technology always improves social
welfare when spillover is very large. That is, there is always a level γP such that
for all γ ≥ γP,
WP > WN.
Proof. There is always a γ > 0 such that
P(XP
R)P(XP
D) = P(XR((1 − γ)πb))P(X0). (9)
For any γ,
P(XR((1 − γ)πb))P(X0) > P(XR((1 − γ)πb)){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb)}.
We deﬁne γP as the γ that satisﬁes (9).
This is independent of the ﬁxed costs but of course there are restrictions
such as (13) that we assume always hold.
Proposition 5. The ratio WN/WP is (i) decreasing in cR and (ii) decreasing
in fR.












































R, we have −dP(XN
R )/dcR > −dP(XP









































The social welfare depends on the product of the adjusted probability of D
stage success and that of R stage success. As a result, when the probability R
stage success becomes high due to lower research cost of that stage (low cR and
low fR), it becomes more eﬃcient to encourage the expansion of the D stage.
Since patentability reduces the D stage adjusted probability, non-patentability
becomes more advantageous. The proposition implies that patentability should
be rejected when the intermediate technology covers a mere “idea” easy to come
up with but its development is relatively much more costly. Something like a
utility standard.
175 Compulsory Licensing
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of compulsory licensing. If there is compul-
sory licensing, the patentee must license the technology to all ﬁrms that want
to engage in D stage R&D.
We will refer to the winner of the R stage as the Leader or patentee and the
other ﬁrms in D stage competitions as the Followers or the licensees. There are
n Follower ﬁrms. If one of the Followers wins the D stage, Leader gets half of










i=1 xi + r
− cDxL − fD. (10)







i xi + r
− cDxi − fD. (11)
The ﬁrst order conditions of maximization are,
v(xL +
P
j6=i xj + r)
2(xL +
P







xj + r)2 − c = 0. (12)
In symmetric (among Followers) equilibrium, x = xj, ∀j = 1...n. It is easy to
show xL = x + r. Substituting this relationship into (11) with the zero proﬁt
condition and (12), we have
x
2((n + 1)x + r)
− cDx − fD = 0,
v(nx
2 + r)
(n + 1)x + r
− cD = 0.
9If the ﬁrm obtains a patent, the technology becomes public information and any ﬁrm is
technologically able to attempt to develop the ﬁnal technology. It is arguable that information
contained in a patent is suﬃcient to use the patented technology just as eﬀectively as the patent
owner. However it seems if the intermediate technology is gene fragments, this is possible. If
the intermediate technology is a chemical entity and the ﬁnal technology is clinical testing,
some ex-ante licensing agreement between patent owner and another ﬁrm would be necessary
and such a contract would be feasible. We restrict our analysis to situations where other ﬁrms
will be equally competent.
18We solve for x and n by ﬁrst deriving





































This condition will also guarantee X0 > 0. The equilibrium investment of
the leader is xL = xF + r . The equilibrium total investment when there is
compulsory licensing, X` = xL + nP







Using xL = xF +r, (10), and (11), we obtain the following relationship between
patent owner’s equilibrium proﬁt, πL, and equilibrium proﬁt of the Followers,
πF,




The left hand side is actually πL since follower proﬁt is 0 in equilibrium. When
the intermediate technology is patentable and compulsory licensing, this is the





This is independent of the ﬁxed cost fD.
Lemma 3. The following relationships always hold, for all fD satisfying (13),
xm < X` < xb < X0, πm > π` > πb .









(13) implies that λ > 2 and 0 < β < 1 √
2 − 1 √
λ. Doing the appropriate substitu-
tion,
























∆ = λ(1 − 2β)2 +
1
(1 − β)2 − 2. (14)










Substituting this into (14),
∆ = λ(1 − 2β)(3 − 4β) − 2.
This will be positive when




























This is negative for λ > 2 and shows that the β∗ < ˆ β and it means ∆ > 0 at
β∗. Since β∗ minimizes ∆, it be ∆ > 0 for any β.
This and (4) implies,
X` < XN
D and π` > πN
D.
Even if there is compulsory licensing, a ﬁrm will want to patent the intermediate
technology. On the other hand, such licensing must always be compulsory.
Because the innovation is a Poisson process, the licensor does not gain from
multiple ﬁrms engaging in D stage.
20Social welfare with patentability and compulsory licensing is,
W` = P(XR(π`))P(X`)s.
The advantage of compulsory licensing is that increase investment in D stage
compared to just patentability. However the draw back is that it reduces in-
vestment in R stage. Comparison with patentability is independent of size of
spillover. How it compares to No Patentable is very similar to comparison with
Patentability.
Proposition 6. Patentability of intermediate technology always improves social
welfare when spillover is very large. That is, there is always a level γ` such that
for all γ ≥ γ`,
W` > WN.
Proof. Deﬁne γ` as
P(XR(π`))P(X`) = P(XR((1 − γ`)π`))P(X0)
Since for any γ,
P(XR((1 − γ)π`))P(X0) > P(XR((1 − γ)π`)){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(X`)},
the Proposition follows.
5.1 General share compulsory licensing
If the government were able to set the division of proﬁt between patentee and
license, what should it be ? We denote by α the share of v that the patentee











and the equilibrium patentee proﬁt is, Licensees’ proﬁts is bit down to 0 in
equilibrium.
The even division of previous section is when α = 1
2. Monopoly proﬁt is
πm = πD(αm), where αm is the smallest α such that nxF = 0. When there is
spillover, α = 0, i.e., X0 = XD(0). Perfectly competitive, compulsory licensing,
10Derivation is in the Appendix.
21and monopoly can be explained by extent of patentee market power, α. The
diﬀerence between entry deterrence and other regimes cannot be explained by
diﬀerence in market power only.
Lemma 4. There are two critical values, αb < αb < 1
2 such that
1. XD(αb) = xb and πD(αb) < πb
2. πD(αb) = πb and XD(αb) < xb.
Proof. Deﬁnitions of πD(α) and XD(α) are,
XD(α) = xL + nxF,
πD(α) =
xL + αnxF
xL + nxF + r
v − cDxL − fD





− cDxL − fD
= πD(αb) + nπF
=
xL + αbnxF + (1 − αb)nxF
xb




− cDxb − fD − nfD
= πb − nfD < πb.
The rest follows from the fact that XD(α) is decreasing in α and πD(α) is
increasing in α.
By requiring share of αb to the patentee, it is possible to have the ﬁrm patent
the intermediate technology for any level of spillover. Lower share increases total
investment in the D stage. It is possible to oﬀer smaller shares by adjusting to
level of spillover.
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23Appendix
Incentive for disclosure and ex-ante incentive for engaging
in research in Green and Scotchmer (1990) Model
One important economic eﬀect of weak utility standard for patentability is to
encourage disclosure of intermediate research, which would help avoid spending
duplicative research and enhance research eﬃciency. The weak standard also
aﬀects ex-ante incentive for engaging in research competition, which is signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected by the availability of trade secret protection. This appendix gives
a sketch of how the framework of Green and Scotchmer (1990) can be used to
shed light on these issues in the case of utility standard. This analysis assumes
that the patent of an intermediate technology still allows the entry of a com-
petitor in the development stage competition, resulting in the ex-post license
when it is successful as in the case of compulsory licensing case. In addition,
it assumes the interim proﬁt which the ﬁrst innovator can get in the case of
novelty standard if he chooses to patent its discovery can be ignored relative to
the ﬁnal proﬁt, due to low interest rate.
We can derive the following three main conclusions, which is stated as a
comparison between utility and novelty standards. First, the incentive for dis-
closure is stronger in the case of weak utility standard than in the case of weak
novelty standard. The payoﬀ of patenting is larger for the ﬁrst innovator (ﬁrm
A). Unlike with the novelty standard, ﬁrm A can obtain a half of the com-
mercialization revenue by patenting in the case of utility standard, even if it
has failed in the second innovation, since the latter infringes the former. The
proﬁtability of choosing trade secret for ﬁrm A declines with the ﬁrst-to-invent
regime (Figure 1). This is because the laggard in the ﬁrst innovation (ﬁrm B) is
more likely to stay in research competition since the proﬁt which it can obtain
if it successfully catches up (by ﬁnishing ﬁrst innovation) is larger. On the other
hand, the payoﬀ for ﬁrm A does not change when it chooses the trade secret
strategy. Thus, ﬁrm A is more likely to patent and disclose the intermediate
technology).
The similar conclusion applies to the ﬁrst-to-invent regime (Figures 1 and
2). As with the ﬁrst-to ﬁle regime, by the patenting strategy, ﬁrm A can obtain
a half of the commercialization revenue in the case of utility standard, even if it
has failed in the second innovation. When ﬁrm A chooses trade secret strategy in
the case of utility standard, the payoﬀ for ﬁrm B is not aﬀected, but ﬁrm A can
24still obtain part of the revenue even if ﬁrm B is successful in both innovations.
This is because the second innovation infringes the ﬁrst innovation, unlike the
case of the novelty standard. The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second eﬀect, so
that ﬁrm A is more likely to patent and disclose the intermediate technology.
Secondly, the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle regime encourages disclosure more than the ﬁrst-
to-invent regime in both weak utility standard case and weak novelty standard
case, although the reasons are a bit diﬀerent. In both cases the ﬁrst innovator A
is assumed to successfully counter-patent when the competitor B catches up and
attempts to patent, with ﬁrst-to-invent. In the case of weak utility standard,
ﬁrm A can receive licensing revenue from ﬁrm B, even if ﬁrm A chooses trade
secret initially and ﬁrm B leap-frogs ﬁrm A, only with ﬁrst-to-invent. Firm A can
still monopolize the market even if ﬁrm B succeeds only in the catching-up with
the ﬁrst innovation. In the case of weak novelty standard, the ﬁrst innovator
can monopolize the market even if ﬁrm A chooses trade secret initially and ﬁrm
B succeeds in the ﬁrst stage of innovation, only with ﬁrst-to-invent. Thus, in
both cases, ﬁrst-to-invent enhances the proﬁtability of trade secret.
Thirdly, the patentability of intermediate technology under a weak standard
is unlikely to reduce the ex-ante proﬁt in the case of utility standard too . This
is because ﬁrm A can secure licensing revenue even if the second ﬁrm succeeds
earlier in completing the second stage of research, only if intermediate technol-
ogy is patented. If ﬁrm A ﬁnds that disclosure of intermediate research reduces
its proﬁt, it can choose trade secret, as in the case of novelty standard. With
ﬁrst-to-invent, patentability of intermediate technology enhances the proﬁt of
ﬁrm A, since it can get the licensing revenue even if ﬁrm B leap-frogs ﬁrm A,
only if the intermediate research is patentable. With ﬁrst-to-ﬁle, as in the case
of novelty standard, ﬁrm A would earn less when it chooses trade secret protec-
tion in the case of weak standard than it would in the case of strong standard
(Figure 3), since ﬁrm B is now less likely to exit from research competition.
General patentee share α
α is the share of v that the Leader will get if a Follower succeeds in the D stage.









i=1 xi + r
− cDxL − fD.





i xi + r
− cDxi − fD. (15)











j6=i xj + r
(xL +
P
xj + r)2 − cD = 0.
In symmetric (among followers) equilibrium, x = xj, ∀j = 1...n. Thus the two
ﬁrst order conditions and the zero proﬁt condition on (15) become, we have
v
(1 − α)nx + r
(xL + nx + r)2 − cD = 0,
v(1 − α)
xL + (n − 1)x + r
(xL + nx + r)2 − cD = 0,
(1 − α)vx
(xL + nx + r)
− cDx − fD = 0,
We ﬁrst solve for x and n by ﬁrst deriving
x2


























This is decreasing in α. Leader is the only ﬁrm that makes positive proﬁt in
equilibrium. The equilibrium D stage proﬁt is,




This is increasing (decreasing) for α < ˜ α (α > ˜ α) and is maximized at α = ˜ α
where ˜ α satisﬁes (1 − ˜ α)2 = cr
v .
We need to determine αm such that XP
D = XD(αm). The share αm is the
minimum level of Leader’s share of Follower’s success that makes it unproﬁtable


























One can also show αm < ˜ α and αm → ˜ α as fD → 0. αm is the share the
minimum share of Leader that will blockade D stage entry if there is no ﬁxed
cost. When there is ﬁxed cost, entry is deterred at a smaller share, αb.
R stage











Welfare for any share α is,
W(α) = P(XR(α))P(XD(α))s,
where P(X) = X
X+r is the adjusted probability. This is concave in α for
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